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Exploration is one of the most com-
mon forms of both communication 
and instruction and yet it is seldom 




by Sandra E. Moriarty 
John Holt tells a little story (1967) about a filth grade 
art class. The teacher held up a paper fan and asked how 
many students knew how to make one. Every child quickly 
made a l ittle fan. Then she read from a set of instructions 
designed for fifth graders on how to make paper fans. She 
read slowly with proper emphasis. After hearing the in-
structions not one child could make a fan. Every parent 
who has tried to assemble a little red wagon on Christmas 
morning knows the debilitating effect of instructions like 
these. 
Explanation is one of the most common forms of both 
communication and instruction and yet it Is seldom 
planned or analyzed. Nettler (1970) has observed that 
"whatever we take for granted. we are least l ikely to ex· 
plain .'' Chomsky (1970) also cites this familiarity problem: 
"We 
lose 
sight of the need for explanation when phe· 
nomena are too familiar or too obvious.·· 
For more people working in their own areas of exper· 
t ise, there are few unknowns and therefore little con-
scious recognition of a need for explanation. Knowing 
what needs to be explained is the hardest part of explain-
ing. The problem is not just limited to areas of technica l 
knowledge. Because of the ambiguity and multiple mean· 
ings built into our language, even common words, if they 
are centr al to message interpretation, may need explana· 
l ion. Chomsky (1970) notes that "even the most familiar of 
phenomena require explanation." 
One of the reasons explanation is given so little 
thought is because there Is virtually no Instruction In the 
art of explaining. There's very little information available 
In the literature of Instruction or communication, two pri-
mary areas of practical explanation. 
There is a tremendous body of literature, however, 
in the areas of history and philosophy of science, analyti· 
cal philosophy, and cognitive psychology. Explanation, in 
those areas is a philosophical term describing the search 
for meaning using the scientific method. Nagel, a leading 
philosopher of science, describes (1961) scientific ex-
planation as "formulating the conditions under which 
events occur, the statements of such determining condi· 
lions being the explanation of such happenings.'' To the 
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scientific mind like Nagel's, an explanation is a statement 
of " repeatable patterns of dependence." 
Explanat ion also Is critical in teach ing and communi-
cating and this more practical dimension of explanatio n is 
the concern here. This paper will develop a model of the 
role of explanation in instructional communication. The 
underlying premise is that the level of explanation is a 
function of the complexity of knowledge being communi-
cated . 
Parameters of Explanation 
The word "explanation" is used in a variety of ways. 
Jane Martin has developed an elaborate schema for de· 
scribing the meaning of all possible variants of the word 
(1970). A simpler version of that type of analysis Is used 
here beginning with the phrase "an explanation," which is 
used to mean the response to a question. (A more formal 
definition of explanation will be developed later.) An ex-
planation is the product or result of an explanatory effort. 
"An explanation" is distinct from "explaining" as in "ex· 
plaining something," which is the act of inquiry or the 
search for an explanation. ''Explaining" is used in another 
sense to mean "explaining something to someone." This 
type of explaining involves a dialectic situation where the 
act of inquiry (explaining) is used to produce a response 
(an explanation) for some person. 
Context. Ttie explanatory situation Is a form of Instru-
mental communication where a particular type of a mes· 
sage, an explanation, is given by someone to someone. 
The explanation is the instrument, the tool, by which the 
desired effect (understanding) will be accomplished. 
Instrumental does not necessarily mean that ex-
planation is bound by an interpersonal communication 
situation. One can explain something to oneself just as 
one can search for an answer to one's ov1n questions 
(Rescher 1970; Nettler, 1970). The lonely scientist working 
late at the lab is searching for an explanation just as is the 
kirrdergartener who is asking why the caterpillar devel· 
oped wings and flew away. 
Roles. There are lwo roles In explanation. The "ex· 
plainer" is aclive and may either be packaging the ex-
planation for dissemination to someone or may be search· 
ing for the answer lo a private question. The "explalnee" 
is passive and perceives and processes lhe Information as 
would any receiver in a communicallon situation. 
An ind ividual searching for a private explanation 
shifts back and forth from search to reflection and alter· 
nates both roles. In interpersonal situations, the roles may 
also shift. One person, let's say a teacher, may provide a 
packaged explanation to a learner who is essentially pas· 
sive In the situation. At the other extreme a teacher may 
encourage learners to assume the explain er role and search 
for their own answers. These self·discovered explanations 
are then reported back to the teacher who becomes the 
explainee. 
The Objective. Explanation is a matter of heuretics or, 
as Rescher describes it, "rendering something clear to 
someone by putting it into a graspable setting" (1970). Ex-
planation moves beyond learning and Into knowing and 
particularly understanding. Most definitions of explana-
t ion, scientific as well as practical, are based on the pro-
cess, act, or instrument involved in making something in-
tell igible or understandable. The objective is always un· 
derstanding (Eysenck, 1970; Meehan, 1968; Rescher, 1970; 
Taylor, 1970; Thyne, 1966; Von Wright, 1971; Williams, 
1970). 
Educational Considerations, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall, 1983 
1
Moriarty: Explanation in Instructional Communication
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017
Understanding is defined in most dictionaries as "to 
know" or "to comprehend" but there's another aspect of 
understanding that is found in definitions using the word 
accept as in ''to accept a fact." Eysenck (1970) defines un· 
derstanding as a cognitive state of acquiescence. The rea· 
son this condition Is Important is that it leads to another 
aspect of explanation and that is complicity. It's already 
been noted that explanation is instrumental in the sense 
that you often want to explain something to someone but 
the other someone can't be an intellectually passive on· 
looker. There must be a spirit of participation or involve· 
ment otherwise explanation becomes, l ike the Zen anal· 
ogy, just one hand clapping. The one seeking to under-
stand must tru ly seek. Flesch (1972) described this essen-
tial condition in one of his books on clear writing: " Noth· 
ing explains itself, there has to be a will and an eagerness 
to learn." 
Definition of Explanation 
Explanation can be defined as form of instrumental 
communication using dialogue and dialectics to generate 
inquiry and understanding. It is instrumental in the sense 
that the explainer wants to make something understand· 
able to someone and the explainee must share a spirit of 
complicity, a willingness to share In the development of 
the explanation. Explanation seeks understanding by mov· 
Ing someone from the unknown to the known through the 
process of Inquiry. 
The Critical Questions 
Any question can lead to an explanation but there are 
certain key questions that cue different types of re-
sponses representing different levels of complexity of 
knowledge. The basic explanatory cue seems to be the 
why question and many of the theorists define explana· 
lion as an answer to the question why (Nagle, 1961; 
Hempel, 1965; Eysenck, 1970). 
Another critical question is what, although it is often 
seen as a cue for descriptive and definitional information 
on a lower level of knowledge than explanation. Von 
Wright distinguishes between what and why when he says 
that the results of interpretation are answers to the ques-
tion "what is this?'' Only when we ask "why is this" he 
says, "are we In a narrower and stricter sense trying to ex-
plain" (1971). What questions are often seen as prelimi -
nary to why questions. Inman suggests that writers ex· 
plain what the subject is before attempting to explain why 
it is (1967). 
Another type of question is how and this elicits pro· 
cess information. Rescher (1970) identifies the how ques· 
tion as the essence of practical explanation, particularly 
as it is used in ''how to" explanations which give proce· 
dures for performance. Eysenck (1970) disagrees with the 
limitation on the how question as a form of practical ex-
planation. He sees it as basic to scientific explanation: 
" Natural science describes, so far as It can, how, or In ac· 
cordance with what rules phenomena happen, but it Is 
wholly incompetent to answer the question why they hap· 
pen." 
The final type of question, which appears rarely In sci· 
entific literature but more often In practical areas, Is the 
so what question. This cues a higher order explanation 
calling for synthesis, interpretation and statements of sig-
nificance. Inman (1967) summarizes the basic questions, 
as well as their internal relationships in the comment that 




lnman 's quote also introduces the concept of hier· 
archy. Throughout the writings of the scientific philoso· 
phers there are references to such relationships as " more 
basic than," "h igher order" or ' 'lower level " (Eysenck, 
1970; Peters, 1970; Taylor, 1970; Von Wright, 1971). By 
analyzing these relationships a hlerarchY. of explanation 
emerges based on levels of knowledge complexity. 
Tourlm (1970) calls this " mapping the areas of higher men· 
tal functions.'' For example, Von Wright (1971) observes 
that one can "ascend In the hierarchy or order of Interpre-
tive acts." Eysenck (1970) elaborates on the what/why rela-
tion ship by saying " descriptive phases must precede 
causal analysis. We cannot seek higher order explanation 
while we are still unsure about lower order uses." 
Level 1: What. The hierarchy that emerges from this 
analysis identifies the what question as a prel iminary ef· 
fort. It serves a basic information acquisition function: 
' 'what is this l ike?" It clarifies te ms and details. The type 
of information given in response inc ludes definitions, de· 
scrlptlons and examples. Definitions classify and cate· 
gorlze and permit comparison and contrast; descriptions 
develop a mental Image, and examples clarify details and 
extend the description to familiar situations. Metaphors 
and analogies also are useful for exemplifying and de-
scribing. 
Ineffective what explanations suffer from problems of 
completeness. The deli n itlon is buried or on Jy half de· 
veloped. The details may not be sufficient or they may be 
irrelevant. Because the source, who Is familiar with the 
topic, fails to predict the unfamlllar, the right terms aren't 
defined and the situation is not described in terms of its 
critical features to the learner. 11 ls the inability to spot the 
unknown that complicates the what explanation. 
Level 2: How. The inquiry behind the how question, 
"how does this work," cues an analysis of process. A how 
response is a process description and can be seen as an 
elaborate form of a what explanation. Narrative tech· 
niques may be used with how questions because telling a 
story is a natural way to describe some processes. How 
explanations are cued by such phrases as "how to do," 
' 'here's how it works," and "a way to . . . . '' Demon-
strations, step-by-step directions, recipes, hints and tips, 
all use how explanations. 
To be effective, how explanations must consider the 
departure point, that is the audience's present state of 
knowledge and the route taken to arrive at understanding. 
Communicators need to relive the process they went 
through initially in learning how to do something or how 
something works and plot a path of critical questions: 
"What did I think at the beginning?" "What did and didn't I 
notice?" "How did I get around that point?" A process ex· 
planation must anticipate the step-by-step questions in 
the audience's mind and tell them at those critical points 
whal to do next and ·which way to turn. An ineffective how 
explanation follows an unnatural route through the pro· 
cess, ignores the decision points, takes divergent paths or 
skips critical steps. A well-crafted " how explanation will 
also give perspective information . at critical points, so 
there's some sense of "where we're heading." 
Level 3: Why. The why question, the heart of explana-
tion, elicits logical mental functioning and the responses 
typically focus on reasons and causes. Sample phrases 
that cue the why explanation are: " because," "in order 
that," uthe answer is," "the causes are," "that's why," 
13 
2
Educational Considerations, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1983], Art. 5
https://newprairiepress.org/edconsiderations/vol10/iss3/5
DOI: 10.4148/0146-9282.1783
"the advantages are," and "here's proof." The structure 
b'ehind a why explanation Is a syllogism. A formal why ex· 
planation will state major and minor premises and the con-
clusion derived from them using either inductive or deduc-
tive reasoning. 
There are two basic types of why questions and the 
distinctions between them preoccupy the writings of the 
scient ific philosophers. "Causal" explanations explain 
why something has happened and "teleological" explana-
tions predict why something will happen. Von Wright ex-
plains the difference: "Causal explanation points to the 
past: this happened because that had happened. Teleo-
logica l explanations point to the future: this happens in or-
der that that should occur" (1971). He further character-
izes causal as explanation that is Gallleoan because of the 
focus on "interesting causes." Teleological explanations 
are Aristotelian because they focus on "interesting ef· 
feels. " 
Ineffective why explanations usually fail for logical 
reasons-the syllogism Is unclear so the audience can' t 
"follow the gist" of the argument. In some cases the con· 
clusion may not follow logically from the premise. Why ex-
planations also may fail because the claim is too exag-
gerated and the proof given doesn't prove the point stated 
causing a belleveability problem. 
Level 4: So What. The so what question calls for the 
highest complexity of knowledge. It analyzes signifi-
cance, it interprets, it synthesizes. The underlying inquiry 
is: "What does this mean?" So What explanations use 
phrases like: "this means that," "the Importance of," and 
"the significance of." Effective so what explanations may 
call for the "the big picture," in the sense that they am-
plify the meaning. This is the function of generalization. 
They also call for the " little picture" In the sense of sim-
plifying so the bare bones of the patterns become appar-
ent. 
So what explanations may be ineffective because 
they get mired in smal l details. Another problem is built 
into the· name of the category: "so what." If the analysis, 
the synthesis, is too abstract it may become inconsequen-
tial to the audience and this elicits a "so what" response 
indicating Indifference. The danger with "the big picture" 
is that It may become intergalactic. 
Hl~rarchy of Explanation 
The chart below summarizes the levels of explana-
tion. It also identifies the key strategies used for each 
type of explanation. 
14 
HIERARCHY OF EXPLANATION 
LEVEL IV: ' 'SO WHAT" 
a. Identify Significance 
b. Synthesize: Ampl ify, Generalize and Simplify 
LEVEL Ill: "WHY" 
a. Identify Causes 
b. Predict 
LEVEL II: " HOW" 
a. Describe Procedure 
b. Demonstrate 
LEVEL I: "WHAT" 
a. Define: Classif y and Provide Synonyms 
b. Discriminate: Compare and Contrast 
c. Describe: Details and Imagery 
d. Exempli fy: Metaphors and Analogies 
An explanation can operate on any one level such as a 
'how to" explanation that Is primarily a demonstration. 
Explanations can also jump around from level to level. An 
usual sequence for a well·crafted explanation would be to 
start with what by describing and defining, then move to 
either how or why where a process is described or reasons 
are given, and end with so what which interprets the sig-
nificance. As new concepts and terms are introduced a 
set of embedded explanations is produced. A map of a 
complex explanation may resemble a series of small em-
bedded loops within a primary series of loops. 
In a book on composition, Snortum (1967) describes 
an explanatory attempt that illustrates the use of multiple 
strategies. His example, however, lacks the structure de-
rived from the concept of a hierarchy based on knowledge 
complexity. He says: 
An explanation shows what lies behind con-
crete Impressions by taking them apart and glv· 
Ing you reasons for them, In a word explaining 
them. You might define the subject, distin-
guish it from other similar subjects, contrast it 
with a familiar counterpart, divide it into its 
components, and use an illustration to keep 
the explanation from getting too abstract. You 
might show a typical example and you may 
even use the techniques of narrat:on and de· 
scription. All techniques then are resources for 
explanation. 
Message Analysis. To Illustrate how explanation 
works, two short passages from composition textbooks 
are analyzed below. The first one Is a Level I: What expla-
nation. The phrases illustrating explanatory attempts are 
in bold face type. 
(situation setting) 
(I: definition of 
technical 
(I: description) 
(I: compare and 
contrast) 
(I: examples) 
When you have to use a phrase or 
technical term that may be unfamiliar to 
your readers, it's your business to 
explain it. Do it simply, brtefly, and 
effectively. Use \VOrds and ideas your 
readers are tam Illar with, but don't 
talk down to them. Here are two tine 
examples of how it's done: 
A second passage uses multiple types of explanation 
and attempts to move beyond the what level and develop 
why and so what explanations. The word cues are marked 
on the passage in parentheses. 
(situation setting) Selecting a part to Illustrate the v1hole, 
(I: def. of "Select· then, involves the writer making 
Ing") a deliberate choice (In order to make) his 





chooses a representative example (because 
II will) clarify the point, (because It 
Is) a valid sample and (because It Is) 
concrete and colorlul . Thereby a good 
example will have a sense of Immediacy 
In Its appeal to and In Its effect upon a 
reader. 
Instructional Communication 
Explaining is very basic to teaching but it isn't 
synonymous. Thyne (1966) makes the point that "to teach 
is to promote learning; to explain is to promote under-
standing." He also points out that understanding does not 
equal learning and learning does not necessarily mean un-
derstanding. On one hand explanation Is a tool of teach· 
ing; on the other hand It cues higher order mental activi-
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t , 
The common ground, however, lies with analysis of 
the learner. The characteristics of explanation (lnstrumen· 
tal situation, dialogue , dia lectics , heuristics, and com· 
pliclty
) 
all demand skill in audience analysis-and so does 
teaching. The decisions that make an explanation effec· 
live are all audience based. Harwell (1960) describes the 
decisions to be made in developing an effective explana· 
lion: determine what they need to know, decide how ele· 
mentary or how detailed, arrange the information In a logl· 
cal order for them, and choose appropriate language. This 
analysi s of the audience/learner's needs Is where lnstruc· 
tion and communication Intersect In explanation . 
As In other areas o f education the process of finding 
an explanation ls more Inst ruc tive than receiving one al· 
ready packaged by the explainer. The challenge, then, In 
Instructiona l communication Is to first sort our the known 
and recognize the unknown and establish the type and 
level of understanding desired. Then the explainer must 
encourage curiosity, elicit the questions, establish the 
dialogue and Incite complicity. Rarely are our expla na· 
lions that well planned; rarely are our explanations as well 
executed as they m ight be. 
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